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Accounting for the Lack of Accountability:
The Great Depression Meets the Great Recession
by STEVEN PEARSE*

Introduction: An Eerily Similar Situation
"The stock markets in the United States entered upon a period
of wild price swings both up and downward. Contemporary observers
were badly shaken by these sudden, recurring plunges."1 Despite this
observation's appropriate reflection on modern society, the quotation
does not concern the economic struggle that the United States
currently faces, but reflects upon the months leading up to Black
Tuesday.2 The present economic situation is eerily similar to the 1929
depression that tested not only the resolve of the American people
but also the American Constitution. Almost eighty years have passed
since the start of the Great Depression, however, the United States
economy tragically finds itself buckling under the weight of the world,
awaiting Herculean relief for a second time.'
Within ten days, the United States saw "the nationalization,
failure, or rescue of what was once the world's biggest insurer, with
assets of $1 trillion, two of the world's biggest investment banks, with
combined assets of another $1.5 trillion, and two giants of America's

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2010; B.A., University
of California, Los Angeles, 2007.
1. WILLIAM K. KLINGAMAN, 1929: THE YEAR OF THE GREAT CRASH at xvii
(Harper & Row 1989).
2. Id. at 281-82. On Tuesday October 29, 1929, panic stricken Americans dumped
immense blocks of stock on the open market, causing the collapse of the stock markets.
3. According to Greek Mythology, Hercules' eleventh labor prompted him to
relieve the Titan, Atlas, from his job of holding up the heavens. EDITH HAMILTON,
MYTHOLOGY: TIMELESS TALES OF GODS AND HEROES 172-74 (Warner Books 1999)

(1942).
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mortgage markets, with assets of $1.8 trillion."' These newly
discovered truths about some of America's leading companies sent
shockwaves throughout an unsuspecting people and greatly
diminished the people's faith in the American economy altogether
This loss of faith encouraged Americans to dump their holdings in
these companies on the open market.6
President George W. Bush and the federal government quickly
took action and began to formulate a plan to resolve the economic
crisis and restore order.7 Despite the clamor for action, Congress
rejected the first proposed Bailout because no oversight governed the
immense power and discretion the proposed bill bestowed upon the
Executive Branch.8 Although the initial plan was not adopted, the
proposal that was ultimately selected to draw the American economy
out of the chaos still treaded upon constitutionally ambiguous
grounds.9 The oversight written into the proposal failed to adequately
protect the American taxpayer's money because amongst other
problems, it stripped away any semblance of political accountability.
And, despite the addition of more oversight under the TARP Reform
and Accountability Act of 2009, true political accountability still
Thus, a delegation of
remains absent from the situation. 10
congressional power that nullifies the American taxpayer's
participation in the governmental system and the sheer magnitude of
the delegation make the Bailout constitutionally ambiguous.
The United States, however, has walked this path before. Just as

the New Deal programs and agencies attempted to solve the
economic collapse that occurred in 1929, the Bailout created a
solution that challenged the flexibility of the Constitution.

And

although flexible, the overbroad delegation and inadequacies of
oversight may have flexed the Constitution to a breaking point.
Similar to several actions taken to remedy the 1929 Depression, the
4. The Financial Crisis? What Next?, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 20-26, 2008, at 19,
available at 2008 WLNR 17853104.
5. David Leonhardt, A 1932-Like Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008,
available at http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/a-1932-like-decline/?scp=l&sq=
%22a%201932-like%20decline%22&st=cse (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
6. Id.
7. Peter G. Gosselin & Maura Reynolds, Tab for Financial Bailout: $700 Billion,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at Al.
8. Id. at A24.
9. Carle Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Defiant House Rejects Huge Bailout; Next
Step Is Uncertain,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at Al.
10. TARP Reform and Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 384, 111th Cong. (2009).
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hastily instituted Bailout represents an over-delegation of
congressional power to the Executive Branch. President Roosevelt's
New Deal and President Bush's Bailout share the intention of saving
the American economy from complete destruction, but the good
intent of these plans does not settle their constitutionality.1'
An examination of the New Deal non-delegation cases provides
support for the notion that the current Bailout follows a similar
model and should accordingly be ruled as an excessive grant of
congressional power to the Executive. In both instances, fearful
people undoubtedly demanded quick action, but Congress's
delegation of power to the Executive Branch probably offends the
separation of delineated powers the Constitution outlays. Although
"[e]xtraordinary conditions may call for extraordinary remedies,"
such conditions "do not create or enlarge constitutional power."' 2 In
the current situation, the Bailout left the American people in an
uncomfortable situation.
Quick relief was granted, but the
Constitution has seemingly been undermined. The ability to hold
responsible parties accountable for problems with the plan is
muddled, and oversight fails to provide such accountability.
Ultimately, however, the immediacy of the situation and the fading
doctrinal practice of evaluating whether a congressional delegation
amounts to an over-delegation will likely leave the situation and
Bailout untouched.
This Note first outlines the necessity for delegations to occur
within the American governmental system.
Following this
examination of the essential need for congressional delegation, the
next section details the over-delegation doctrine as it emerged during
the Depression era. The Note then turns to explore the virtual
abandonment of the over-delegation doctrine after the United States
recovered from the Great Depression.
Subsequent to this
exploration, the next section provides an overview of the origins of
the current economic situation. Following this overview, the Note
examines the reasons for the Bailout and then the oversight attached
to it. The next section discusses the reform used to add oversight to
the "Bailout." Ultimately, the piece explores the parallels between
the Great Depression and the current recession and the reasons for
the revival of the over-delegation doctrine.

11. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935).
12. Id.
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I. Necessary Evil: Shifting Responsibility
Article I, Section 1 of the United States Constitution explicitly
declares that "a]ll legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in
a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and
House of Representatives."' 3 This declaration guarantees that
Congress alone shall possess specific powers." Accordingly, the
United States Supreme Court declared that Congress "is not
permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative
functions with which it is thus vested."' 5 This declaration seemingly
prohibits the delegation of powers by Congress. The Court, however,
did not completely close off the idea of delegation.
The Framers did not intend to overburden Congress so much
that it would act as an obstacle to a workable National Government."
Alluding to a future of permissible delegations, Thomas Jefferson
said, "Nothing is so embarrassing nor so mischievous in a great
assembly as the details of execution."' 7 Moreover, the Constitution
"has never been regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary
resources of flexibility and practicality."' 8
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court held that
"Congress must be permitted to delegate to others at least some
authority that it could exercise itself."' 9 Therefore, at its discretion,
Congress may vest power "inthe officer of its choice or in a board or
commission such as it may select or create for the purpose."20 The
Court's perspective regarding delegation stems from "a practical
understanding that in our increasingly complex society... Congress21
simply cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power.,
Although delegation has proven to be an indispensable governmental
tool, it simultaneously generates many problems. The delegation of
congressional power creates a conflict with separation of powers and
strips Americans of their ability to hold parties politically accountable
13. U.S CONST. art. I, § 1.
14. Id.
15. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 529.
16. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 758 (1995).
17. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Aug. 4, 1787), in 5 THE
WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 319 (Paul L. Ford ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1904-05).
18. Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935).
19. Loving, 517 U.S. at 758 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 42
(1825)).
20. Pan. Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 420.
21. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
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for any abuse of the delegated power. Thus, although Congress can
delegate its authority "sufficient to effect its purposes," these
delegations must be examined to assure Congress has not
surrendered too much of its power at the expense of both the
Constitution and the American people.22
Delegation of congressional power inherently grants the
Executive or Judicial Branches more power than the Constitution
intended.' The transfer of legislative powers to the other branches
offends the balance of power between the three branches. Increasing
the power of one branch through the transfer of power from another
creates an imbalance between them and strains the established checks
and balances system. In the current situation, Congress's unguided
delegation leaves the actions by the Executive Branch virtually
unchecked. This, along with the lack of political accountability,
should caution the American public against the ignorant acceptance
of this particular delegation.
Voting politicians out of office serves as the traditional remedy
for political abuses and dissatisfaction. Giving the other branches the
powers reserved for Congress, particularly in an election year,
circumvents this established practice. The Bailout occurred in the
midst of the 2008 election campaign. 2' During this election, thirty-five
Senate seats, all seats in the House of Representatives, and the
presidency were at stake.' With the passage of the Bailout, Congress
squarely placed the economic situation on an outgoing presidential
administration. 26 Thus, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson's
actions between the passage of the Bailout and the beginning of
President Barack Obama's administration created a situation where
actual accountability was removed. Despite dips to President Bush's

22. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778 (1948) (emphasis omitted).
23. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1.
24. David M. Herszenhorn, Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at Al.
25. Susan Page, In Congress, a Democratic wave; Economic concerns fuel a 'turning
point' in politics, USA TODAY, Nov. 5, 2008, at Al.

26. President George W. Bush signed the Bailout bill into law October 3, 2008,
warning Americans that "[t]his will be done as expeditiously as possible, but it cannot be
accomplished overnight. We'll take the time necessary to design an effective program that
achieves its objectives-and does not waste taxpayer dollars." Mark Landler & Edmund
L. Andrews, For Treasury Dept., Now Comes Hard Partof Bailout, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
2008, at Al.
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approval ratings, which were already on the decline,27 no real
consequences existed for mishandling the financial situation.
Therefore, voting in favor of the Bailout effectively left the American
people with no remedy to conjure up against this political sleight of
hand.
To assure that Congress has not over delegated its powers to
another branch or administrative agency, the United States Supreme
Court established guidelines to evaluate the delegation. Congress can
delegate powers specifically granted to it by the Constitution by
declaring a policy and defining "the circumstances in which its
command is to be effective." ' Minimally, Congress must only assert
"an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to
take action is directed to conform., 29 Although the language of these
evaluation guides is not definitively constructed, it does provide some
guidance on how to determine whether Congress provided sufficient
direction to the entity receiving the power. Moreover, because the
guidelines for establishing whether a congressional delegation is
permissible have been continually relaxed, it makes it more difficult
to categorize any delegation by Congress as an over-delegation.
Therefore, there is a strong degree of deference to Congress when it
determines if a delegation of power is necessary, as shown through
the United States Supreme Court's reluctance to enforce the nondelegation doctrine since the New Deal era."
The New Deal era, however, provides several instances in which
the United States Supreme Court expressly found delegations by
Congress to offend the Constitution.'
Despite the lenient rules
revolving around congressional delegations, Congress too loosely and
too greatly gave up its powers in these instances.32 These overdelegations to the Executive Branch responded to the tumultuous
economic period originating in 1929."3

The current economic

situation, again, places the American people in a similar position as it

27. In the final days of his presidency, President George W. Bush's approval rating
fell to 22 percent. Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Finds Disapprovalof Bush Unwavering,N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 17,2009, at All.
28. Opp Cotton Mills, Inc., v. Adm'r, 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941).
29. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co., v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
30. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
31. See, e.g., Pan. Ref. Co., v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
32. Pan Ref Co., 293 U.S. 388; Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495.
33. KLINGAMAN, supra note 1, at 259-61.
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found itself after Black Tuesday. Although the governmental
responses to the 1929 depression and the 2008 recession are
significantly different, the reasons behind the delegations create an
analogy between the two situations that should not be overlooked.
Financial crisis prompted Congress to act in both instances, and an
examination of the former should give guidance to the categorization
of the latter. Examination of the New Deal non-delegation cases lend
support to the idea that the current Bailout follows a similar pattern
and should also be ruled as an excessive grant of congressional power
to the Executive Branch.
II. Over-Delegation and the New Deal
The dire economic situation that arose in 1929 called for the
American government to take quick action to curb the economic
downward spiral.
As hope became fleeting, the American
government began to walk down new paths in search of an answer to
its economic woes. And the Constitution fostered such exploration of
a positive solution. The genius construction of the Constitution
allows the American government to change with respect to its own
progression into modernity. Thus, the New Deal ultimately ushered
in "a new era of constitutional law and constitutional interpretation,
in which the Constitution was adapted to facilitate a new realm of
American governance." '
Despite this trend, the urgency of the
situation, and the dismal position of the American people, the
Constitution proved to have its limits. The United States Supreme
Court firmly asserted that sacrificing the cornerstone of American
government was not an option no matter the circumstances. 5
Although President Roosevelt acted in what he believed to be
the best interest of the country, the New Deal non-delegation cases
established precedents against permitting the unchecked and
overbroad delegation of congressional power to the President. In
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, and Carter v. Carter Coal Co., the United States Supreme

Court found that provisions passed pursuant to the 1933 National
Industrial Recovery Act ("NIRA") were over-delegations of
congressional powers to the Executive Branch.36 These cases

34.

G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 3 (2000).

35. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 528.
36. See Pan. Ref. Co., 293 U.S. 388; Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. 495; Carter v.
Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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demonstrate that extraordinary obstacles cannot be overcome at the
expense of the Constitution. And, more importantly, they provided a
cautionary tale to be heeded by future sessions of Congress.
The NIRA was created to establish cooperative prices for
particular American industries. 7 Specifically, Section 9(c) of the
NIRA permitted the prohibition of interstate or foreign petroleum
trade.38 Accordingly, President Roosevelt issued several executive
orders regulating the interstate and foreign petroleum trade.39 He
justified these executive orders by stating the restrictions would
"encourage national industrial recovery.., foster fair competition...
and to provide for the construction of certain useful public works."4
These goals, of course, were outlined as part of an overall plan to
reverse the effects of the economic collapse originating in 1929.
Despite these good intentions, Article I, Section 8 of the United
States Constitution gives Congress, not the President, the exclusive
right to regulate interstate and foreign trade." In Panama Refining
the Supreme Court found that Section 9(c) of the NIRA was an over
delegation of congressional powers to the Executive Branch. The
Court declared that Section 9(c) of the NIRA gave "to the President
an unlimited authority to determine the policy and to lay down the
prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may see fit. ' 43 Interpretation
of the decision, however, progresses the idea that "attachment of a
few procedural safeguards to congressional delegations might assuage
the Court's constitutional concerns." 44
After Panama Refining, the United States Supreme Court again
found an over delegation of congressional power in Schechter
Poultry.4' The issue in Schechter Poultry was Section 3 of the NIRA,

which "authorizes the President to approve 'codes of fair
competition. ' ' 46 The purpose of the codes was to protect consumers,
competition, and employees. 7 The legislation itself prevented the
37. WHITE, supra note 34, at 110.

38. Pan. Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 406.
39. Id. at 405.
40. Id. at 405 n.1.
41. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
42. WHITE, supra note 34, at 110.
43. Pan. Ref Co., 293 U.S. at 415.
44. WHITE, supra note 34, at 110.

45. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 495 (1935).
46. Id. at 521-22.
47. Id. at 522.
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forced sale of sick poultry along with healthy ones.' Despite the
unequivocal worthiness of upholding poultry standards, Congress lost
its game of chicken with the Judiciary when the Court found the
provision to be an over delegation of power. '9
Representatives of a given industry, not elected officials, were
charged to draft the codes themselves. 0 Afterwards, the proposed
drafts were to be sent to the president for approval. This delegation
circumvented the accountability principles imagined by the
Constitution because unelected agents would be the architects behind
the codes. 2 By having unelected persons write the codes, the
government stripped the public of its only recourse, which is to hold
elected officials accountable.53 Moreover, Congress failed to provide
any guidance for the Executive Branch to follow in terms of the
meaning of "fair competition." 4 Based on the construction of Section
3 of the NIRA, "'fair competition' meant, in effect, whatever a group
of unelected, industry representatives and the President said it
meant."55
In defense of the codes, the government asked the Court to view
them "in the light of the grave national crisis with which Congress was
confronted. 5 6 Despite the gravity of the economic situation, the
"necessity and validity of such provisions ... cannot be allowed to

obscure the limitations of the authority to delegate, if our
constitutional system is to be maintained."57 Therefore, although the
government had good intentions to resolve the dire economic
problem, Congress's "delegation running riot" could not be
condoned.58
Carter Coal further solidified the non-delegation doctrine
through the Supreme Court's invalidation of the Bituminous Coal
Conservation Act of 1935 ("BCCA"). 59 The BCCA, like the NIRA,

48.
49.
50.
51.

Id.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 521-22.
Id.
52. WHITE, supra note 34, at 111.
53.

Id.

54. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 531.
55. WHITE, supra note 34, at 111.
56. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 528.
57. Id. at 530.
58. Id. at 553 (Cardozo, J., concurring).
59. WHITE, supra note 34, at 112.
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sought to alleviate the pressure the Great Depression put on the
American people. The act attempted to stabilize "the [coal] industry
though the regulation of labor and the regulation of prices." 6 Despite
the good intent of the Act to help establish maximum hours,
minimum wages, and fair competition within the industry, Congress
once again delegated too much of its powers.6'
In Carter Coal, the Court held that a delegation of congressional
legislative power to private persons was grossly impermissible.62
Justice Sutherland found this particular delegation particularly
egregious because it was "not even delegation to an official or an
official body, presumptively disinterested, but to private persons
whose interests may be and often are adverse to the interests of
others in the same business. '' 63 CarterCoal further demonstrated that
the Court was unwilling to bend the Constitution to a breaking point
despite the gravity of the financial situation. 6'
Although the delegations in Panama Refining, Schechter Poultry,

and Carter Coal, have different components and features than the
Bailout, the reasons behind the delegations make the situations
analogous. America's desire to strive past its fiscal hardships pushed
it to bend the Constitution as much as possible to alleviate the
economic pressures bearing down on it. The Court, however, has
firmly held that Congress cannot bend the Constitution to a breaking
point, no matter how worthy the cause.65

Presently, Congress has

more latitude to establish when it is necessary and proper to delegate
its powers to another branch of the government. Since the New Deal
era, the Court has affirmed this deference through a series of cases
that have permitted delegations of congressional powers.66

III. Delegations After the Depression
Panama Refining, Schechter Poultry, and Carter Coal, revealed

that congressional grants of power to the Executive Branch could
potentially be impermissible delegations of power. But since these
decisions, no other federal laws have been categorized as
60. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 278 (1936).
61. Id. at 314-15.
62. Id. at 311.
63. Id.
64. See generally Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238.
65. See id.; Pan. Ref. Co., v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp., v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
66. Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996).
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impermissible delegations.67 No matter how broad or substantial any
delegation has been, no majority within the Supreme Court has
analogized these instances with the New Deal non-delegation cases
because it "almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress
regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left
to those executing or applying the law."' ' Despite this relaxation in
policing congressional delegations of power, the Bailout has the most
potential to revive the non-delegation doctrine. The sheer magnitude
of the power granted to the Secretary of the Treasury may be a
sufficient catalyst to resuscitate the presumably dead doctrine.
If Congressional delegations are accompanied by "an intelligible
principle," they will not be considered an over-delegation of
legislative powers. 69 The inclusion of an "intelligible principle" in the
delegation establishes a standard "to which the person or body
authorized to [take action] is directed to conform...." 70 This ensures
that Congress include "standards to guide" the entity entrusted to
wield the congressional power in the manner that Congress
intended.7 Despite the enumeration of this principle, the United
States Supreme Court has relaxed the standard, permitting
congressional delegations that loosely interpret the meaning of
"intelligible principle."72
Despite the creation of these standards to evaluate delegations,
the last time the Supreme Court declared a delegation impermissible
was "over a half century ago."73 Moreover, the Supreme Court does

not always strictly enforce the "intelligible principle" standard, often
affirming that delegations made in the "public interest" satisfy the
"intelligible principle" benchmark.74 However, the degree of the
delegation should still be weighed to determine whether an over
delegation occurred.75 Accordingly, the limitations of this delegation
"must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent
necessities of the governmental co-ordination., 76 Measuring "the
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Loving, 517 U.S. at 771.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., v. United States, 276 U.S. 394. 409 (1928).
Id.
See Nat'l Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974).
See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928).

420
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degree of generality contained in the authorization for exercise of
executive or judicial powers in a particular field" further indicates if
the delegation "is so unacceptably high as to amount to a delegation
of legislative powers." 77 A measurement of the amount of the
delegation, particularly in regards to the Bailout, provides a stark
indicator of its permissibility.
Although both America and its government have changed
tremendously since the United States Supreme Court last used the
non-delegation doctrine to declare an act of Congress
unconstitutional, the Bailout is unlike anything previously examined.
The amount of money involved in this delegation, combined with the
lack of sufficient oversight make the Bailout different enough from
previous delegations to potentially revive the non-delegation
doctrine. In the past, the Court has justified delegations solely
because they were based in the "public interest," but the substantial
monies involved in the Bailout and the hesitancy of the American
people to squander finite financial resources likens the situation more
to the New Deal non-delegation cases rather than to the interim
period cases. Although the Court has used the non-delegation
doctrine sparingly, the degree of authority Congress has delegated to
the Executive Branch may be sufficient to resuscitate the doctrine's
application. Therefore, the Supreme Court's hesitance to secondguess Congress's decisions regarding delegation and hesitance to
make a finding that the Bailout delegation is impermissible can be
reconciled through an examination of the degree of power
surrendered.
IV. The Great Recession
The present chaos originated through the sub-prime mortgage
frenzy, ultimately leading to the tailspin of some of America's most
successful financial institutions and the implosion of the American
Stock Market.78 Prominent financial powerhouses could no longer
hide behind their names and reputations, and were forced to disclose
the grim truth about their financial situations. Bear Sterns, Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Merrill Lynch,

77. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 419 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. Vikas Bajaj & Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads Beyond Subprime Loans,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at Al.
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Washington Mutual, Morgan Stanley, and Goldman Sachs either
ceased to exist or were on the brink of disintegration. 9
To prevent a complete collapse of all of these financial
institutions and avoid a total breakdown of the American economy,
the Executive Branch took quick and decisive action to bail these
companies out of their self-inflicted financial crisis.' The companies
irresponsibly handled their funds, and the American people suffered
as a result. Accordingly, President George W. Bush and the
Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Paulson, engineered a sweeping
proposal that called for the release of $700 billion to the Secretary to
buy the troubled assets that burdened these companies.81 The initial
proposal sought to make the Secretary's decisions "non-reviewable
and committed to agency discretion" and further stipulated that the
decision could "not be reviewed by any court of law or any
The inclusion of such an explicit
administrative agency. '
congressional delegation of unchecked power to the Executive
Branch ultimately led to the demise of this particular proposal, but a
revised version would soon take its place. 3
Congressional members on both sides of the aisle were not ready
to accept the complete absence of oversight that ihe Executive
Branch sought through the bill's original form. The Speaker of the
House, Nancy Pelosi, demanded "strong oversight mechanisms,"
while California Senator Diane Feinstein similarly rejected the lack of
legislative and judicial review placed on the Secretary of the Treasury
and the unilateral capabilities the Executive Branch would have at its
These sentiments represent the implicit belief that
disposal. '
entrusting the Executive Branch with unchecked spending power
would be an over delegation of congressional spending power.
Despite these inclinations toward over delegation, on October 3,
2008, a revised version of the Economic Emergency Stabilization Bill

79. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 4.
80. Gosselin & Reynolds, supra note 7.
81. Heroes Earning Assistance and Relief Tax Act of 2007, H.R. 3997, 110th Cong. (2008).
82. Id.
83. Hulse & Herszenhorn, supra note 9.
84. Gosselin & Reynolds, supra note 7, at A24. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi
rejected the original plan saying that "[Congress] will strengthen the proposal by ensuring
that the government is accountable to the taxpayers ... implementing strong oversight
mechanisms and establishing fast-track authority for the Congress to act on responsible
regulatory reform .. " California Senator Diane Feinstein flatly rejected the proposal
saying "[i]t essentially creates an economic czar with no administrative oversight, no legal
review, no legislative review." Id.
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Congress. 5

("EESB") came before
Congress and the President both
approved the newly formed Troubled Asset Relief Program
("TARP"). 86 Despite the clamor for strict oversight by members of
Congress, the mere inclusion of oversight provisions does not
necessarily establish that oversight was installed in the new proposal.
Oversight protections were included in § 5226 and § 5229 in the form
of legislative inspection and judicial review; the Secretary of the
Treasury, however, virtually retained unilateral control over $350
billion.' Therefore, the delegation of spending power given to the
Executive Branch through the Secretary of the Treasury appears to
be an overextension of congressional authority based on the degree of
power extended.
V. Why Congress Wrote the Check
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the authority "to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defense and general Welfare of the United States....
This constitutional provision specifically gives spending power to
Congress. And, the United States Supreme Court held that when
"considering whether a particular expenditure is intended to serve
general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the
judgment of Congress. ''89 Based on the language used in the
Constitution and the deferential position taken by the United States
Supreme Court, Congress has wide latitude in determining whether a
purpose is for the general welfare when exercising its spending power.
The TARP provides a laundry list of justifications for its
implementation.' ° These justifications include protecting "home
values, college funds, retirement accounts, and life savings" among
other superficial benefits that sufficiently categorize the TARP as
being for the "general welfare." 9' Thus, the inclusion of these
justifications gives Congress solid ground on which to validate the
spending; but, the purposes seem insufficient to justify such a
momentous congressional delegation to the Secretary of the
85. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008).
86. 12 U.S.C. § 5211 et seq. (2006).
87. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5226, 5229 (2006).
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
89. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619 (1937)).
90. 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2008).
91. Id.
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Treasury. Because the requisite general welfare purpose has been
satisfied through the TARP's "purposes" section, Congress can
legitimately authorize the spending necessary to accommodate the
economic climate." Instead of implementing the spending plan
through its own devices, however, Congress chose to delegate the
responsibility to the Executive Branch.
By charging the Executive Branch with the responsibility of
spending the $700 billion, Congress created a more harrowing
dilemma even though the appropriation and spending of the funds is
completely justified by the situation. And, although the Bailout
pertains to spending rather than the exercise of legislative power in
the traditional sense, spending can still be appropriately categorized
under the more conventional meaning of legislative powers.'
Conventionally, legislative powers consist of all powers outlined in
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. 9 Spending is included in
these enumerated powers, and its transfer to a different institution is
properly categorized as a delegation of legislative power. 95 Therefore,
although the requisite "general welfare" purpose to exercise the
spending power has been satisfied, the transfer of the spending power
to the Executive Branch remains ambiguous in terms of
permissibility. An evaluation of the oversight provision built into the
Bailout and the supplemental oversight provided by the TARP
Reform and Accountability Act of 2009 demonstrates that the degree
of power given to the Secretary of the Treasury still exceeds what
should be categorized as permissible.
VI. Oversight?
An examination of the oversight provisions included in the
Bailout legislation greatly weighs into the determination of whether
the delegation is permissible. Although the Bailout needed to be
implemented hastily to avoid further economic backlash, and will
hopefully have positive benefits, the finalized law provided scant
oversight in relation to the large sums of money allocated. Oversight
for the delegation is necessary to continue the system of checks and
balances and to assure that the Secretary of the Treasury does not

92. Id.
93. Larry Alexander & Saikrishna Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine's
Death Are Greatly Exaggerated,70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1297,1308 (2003).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1310.
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abuse or misallocate the funds entrusted to him. And, despite the
inclusion of oversight provisions within the Bailout, it insufficiently
policed the activities of both the Secretary of the Treasury and the
companies that received monies."
As opposed to the original bill's release of the entire $700 billion
to the Secretary of the Treasury, the TARP created a staged release
of funds. As Section 5225 provides, upon the enactment of the
TARP, $250 billion would be released to the discretion of the
Secretary of the Treasury. 97 Another $100 billion will be released
when the President provides Congress with a written certification that
the Treasury Secretary needs the extra funds.' Therefore, $350
billion was at the immediate disposal of the Secretary of the Treasury,
and was spent before any real oversight was installed. 99 Although not
as great a sum as $700 billion, the immediate release of $350 billion
provided the Secretary of the Treasury with a virtual blank check to
use at his discretion.
Moreover, under Section 5526, the Comptroller General of the
United States shall "commence ongoing oversight of the activities and
performances of the TARP... including vehicles established by the
Secretary under this Act."' '° The Comptroller would thus have full
access to the records associated with TARP activities and would have
to report to the requisite congressional committees and the Special
Inspector General of TARP every sixty days. 1 The Comptroller
General shall also provide the requisite congressional committees
with a financial audit.'02 Furthermore, TARP must also "establish and
maintain an effective system of internal control, consistent with the
standards prescribed under Section 3512(c) of title 31, United States
Code."' 3

96. Matt Apuzzo, Where'd the bailout money go? Banks aren't saying, USA TODAY,
Dec. 26, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/2008-12-22bailout-money-whereN.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2008).

97. 12 U.S.C. § 5225 (2008).
98. Id.
99. Amit R. Paley, Bailout Lacks Oversight Despite Billions Pledged: Watchdog Panel
Is Empty; Report Is Unfinished, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2008, at Al.
100. 12 U.S.C. § 5226 (2008).
101. Id.

102. Id.
103. Id.
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Section 5229 further provides for judicial review of the actions
carried out by the secretary." Injunctions may be issued to prevent
the Secretary of the Treasury from acting in a particular course of
action or arrest an action already implemented.
Although judicial
review exists, its implementation also remains ambiguous. A separate
standing issue arises as a byproduct of the judicial review section.
Who, if anyone, would have standing to bring an action against the
Secretary to forestall his actions?
The individual American
taxpayer's interest is "shared with millions of others; is comparatively
minute and indeterminable" from other taxpayers.' °6 Thus, an
individual taxpayer would certainly fail to gain standing based solely
07
on the claim of misapplication of his or her individual tax dollars.'
And, while the institutions that receive the money would be an ideal
candidate to test the standing waters, would any of them stop the flow
of money to their own companies? The Supreme Court has warned
that when "the scope of the delegation is largely uncontrollable by
the courts, [it] must be particularly rigorous in preserving the
Constitution's
structural
restrictions
that
deter
excessive
delegations. ''
This further demonstrates a lack of adequate
oversight safeguards to assure that American tax dollars are spent for
the benefit of the American people rather than the benefit of fiscally
irresponsible companies. The consequences of the lack of oversight
weigh heavily upon both the American people and the continuation
of its chosen type of government.
VII. TARP Reform and Accountability Act of 2009
The oversight applied to the original TARP suggests oversight
without any teeth. The initial release of funds and the Secretary of
the Treasury's use of those funds could be received and spent long
before the first required sixty day report would be made to
Congress." 9 As it happens $290 billion of the initial $350 billion was
pledged to companies seeking relief before the TARP oversight
board filled its positions." Senator Judd Gregg of New Hampshire

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

12 U.S.C. § 5229 (2008).
Id.
Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447,487 (1923).
Id.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416-17 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Paley, supra note 99.
Id.
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said "[w]e put in place tremendous regulatory oversight so that there
The oversight installed in the
will be absolute transparency."''.
original plan, however, has proven more opaque than transparent.
Although the allocation of money from the government to the
recipients of TARP funds had been tracked, the public had no way of
seeing how these companies spend the money after it is received."'
JPMorgan Chase received $25 billion though TARP, but the company
declined to publicly disclose how the money was spent. 113 Other
companies have followed suit and refused to disclose how they used
the Bailout money." 4 Despite pleas against hoarding the money or
using it for "bonuses, junkets, or to buy other banks.... no process
[existed] to make sure that's happening and no consequences for
banks that don't comply.""' 5
Moreover, the Treasury Department agreed to post every
transaction, but only a listing of recipients and the amounts given
have been made public."6 Since companies did not have to disclose
how they spend their allocated Bailout funds, accountability vanished.
No real evidence existed to demonstrate that the companies used the
funds appropriately. Although some companies were censured for
misusing funds, no punishment was really accorded. 7 To remedy the
situation, House Financial Services Committee Chairman Barney
Frank pushed for the addition of more oversight to TARP through an
amendment."8 The TARP Reform and Accountability Act of 2009's
("RAA") purpose was to "strengthen accountability, close loopholes,
increase transparency."" 9 The RAA provided a more comprehensive
and detailed oversight system than TARP originally implemented.
Despite the changes, however, the issue of actual political
accountability is still left unanswered.

111. Id.
112. Sharyl Attkisson, Where Is the Bailout Money Really Going?, CBS, Nov. 12, 2008,
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/l 1/12/eveningnews/main4597233.shtml?
source=RSSattr=HOME_4597233 (last visited Oct. 19, 2009).
113. Apuzzo, supra note 96.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. David R. Sands, Bankers deny misusing TARP money: Donors gave House panel
$1.8 million, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2009, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2009/feb/12/bankers-defend-record-use-bailout-funds/.
118. TARP Reform and Accountability Act of 2009, H.R. 384, 111th Cong. (2009).
119. Id.
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The RAA made the entire process initiated by TARP more
transparent in terms of policing the companies that receive TARP
funds, specifically by requiring all companies that receive or will
receive funds to provide public accountings of the use of the relief
monies.2 The Secretary of the Treasury and new recipients of TARP
funds are also to establish an agreement on how the funds are to be
12
used and meet specified benchmarks to further the goals of TARP. '
The amendment further restricted the excessive compensation of
company executives. 122 Most strikingly, the amendment subtracted
from the Secretary of the Treasury unilateral power, allowing for the
Financial Stability Oversight Board the power to overturn acts of the
Treasury Secretary by a two-thirds vote.
The inclusion of more
oversight makes the acceptance of the Bailout a more comfortable
situation for both the Judiciary to potential affirm the Bailout and for
the American public.
Despite the inclusion of more rigorous policing provisions, the
degree of delegation remains relatively high in comparison to the
provisions previously held as permissible by the Supreme Court.
Scrutinizing the companies that receive TARP funds gives more
assurances that the allocations are not spent on extravagances, but
this scrutiny does not guarantee that the money is being spent
correctly.
This amendment, however, somewhat misleads the
American public by giving the impression that if the funds are not
being spent on lavish amenities then they are being spent correctly.
Therefore, although congressional delegations are permitted, "it is
the hard choices.., which must be made by the elected representatives
of the people.', 24 The Treasury Secretary, although policed by the
oversight committee and susceptible to judicial review, retains wide
latitude in allocating the funds. Decisions pertaining to $700 billion
during a period of economic deterioration should be the
responsibility of Congress rather than an unelected official.
Blame can always be assessed, but true accountability remains
absent from the Bailout even with the amendment in place. Congress
transferred a large responsibility to the Executive Branch, and
because this transfer occurred during an election year, Congress's
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 687 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring).
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motives appear more suspect. Although the Bush Administration
encouraged the passage of the Bailout, a two-term president in the
waning months of his presidency had little to lose from public
disapproval 1 5 Furthermore, because the first $350 billion was spent
prior to President Obama's taking office, his administration avoids
any blame for any inappropriate spending."' Thus, the American
public has no real recourse against the Executive Branch for the
abuse of tax dollars.
VIII. The Common Thread
Similar to the New Deal cases that were found to be overdelegations the Bailout attempted to resolve a catastrophic economic
crisis by giving the Executive Branch a free hand to deal with the
situation as it saw fit.127 Although much time has passed since the

Supreme Court last found any congressional provision an overdelegation, the degree of the Bailout delegation is more in line with
the over-delegations than with those permitted. The lack of political
accountability amounts to an obstacle too great to overcome based on
the magnitude of the delegation.
The New Deal over-delegations and the Bailout find
commonalities not only in the context of the situations that created
them, but in the degree of power surrendered by Congress and the
Executive Branch's assumption of that power. Like the New Deal
provisions found to be over-delegations, the Bailout is a brand of
legislation that arose from the necessity of a situation rather than
from deliberation and planning. The situational origins make both
the New Deal over-delegations and the Bailout more analogous to
one another than the cases that occurred in the interim period. These
over-delegations represent legislation that responded to problems
that required fast action. And, hasty implementation of this type of
the consequences that
ultimately overlooked
legislation
simultaneously emerged.
Moreover, the gravity of the situations during both the Great
Depression of 1929 and the "Great Recession" of 2008 further
illustrate a similar intent. The purpose of the Bailout was to
"immediately provide authority and facilities that the Secretary of the

125. Thee-Brenan, supra note 27.
126. Paley, supra note 99.
127. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
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Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to the financial
system of the United States., 128 Similarly, Congress intended the New
Deal enactments to curtail the financial hardships that threatened to
break the American economy. The good intentions of stopping
economic turmoil in either period fail to justify a deviation from the
intent of the constitutional Framers. Thus, just as a good intent was
insufficient when the Supreme Court heard the New Deal overdelegation cases, it should remain the same today.
More strikingly, however, is the similarity between the degrees of
power surrendered by Congress. The New Deal over-delegation
cases dealt with very different grants of legislative power from the
Bailout, but the amount of congressional power remains within the
same arena. Each instance represents an unprecedented cession of
power. In both situations, unelected officials wielded tremendous
powers better reserved for an elected Congress. The New Deal Court
found this transfer of power to unelected officials egregious. 9
Although the Secretary of the Treasury is more qualified and less
biased than private groups, he remains immune from the
consequences of accountability. Therefore, the amount of power
ceded by Congress in the New Deal over-delegation cases is
appropriately analogized to the amount of power Congress granted to
the Secretary of the Treasury through the Bailout delegation.
The similarities between the two eras of delegation are present,
and should not be overlooked because of the time disparity that exists
between them. Although over-delegation has not been invoked since
the New Deal over-delegation cases, the striking resemblance
between 1929 and the present make the situation ideal for a
resurgence of the non-delegation doctrine.
Conclusion
The hallowed pages of the Constitution have led the United
States through times of war and depression and peace and prosperity.
During America's darkest hours it has guided the people back to a
bright tomorrow. Despite the drastic changes that have occurred
since its creation, the architects behind the Constitution inserted the
flexibility necessary for it to progress with the world. To abuse this
flexibility for whatever reason threatens to undermine the American
way of life. No matter the circumstances, the United States cannot
128. 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2008).
129. Id.
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afford to sacrifice the Constitution in any form because to do so
would betray the very way of life sought to be protected.
Although the current economic situation has not reached the
heights of the Great Depression, Congress felt it necessary to run
down the same paths that the Supreme Court previously forbade.
The New Deal legislation that the Supreme Court found
unconstitutional featured comparable qualities to the "Bailout."
Given the similarities between the economic situations of both time
periods, analogizing the legislation, despite the passage of time and
changes in government, seems appropriate. In an attempt to quell
economic unrest, Presidents Roosevelt, Bush, and Obama, and
Congress did what they thought was in the best interest of the
country. Decisions made in haste, however, fail to contemplate all of
the inevitable ramifications. With any congressional act, "Congress
can proceed only from legitimate authority, not from good intentions
alone."13
Despite the changes to the American government and the great
deference given to Congress when it chooses to delegate its powers,
giving the Executive Branch $700 billion to spend with only the initial
faqade of oversight in place appropriately prompts questioning.
Although the TARP Reform and Accountability Act increased
oversight over the monies, only time can determine whether strict
enforcement will occur. The American people, although demanding
quick action, should not be stripped of their rights concerning
accountability, nor should the tradition of separation of powers be so
easily cast aside in favor of quick solution that may or may not work.
The nature of the economic situation and the outcry for quick
action will probably result in the upholding of the Bailout legislation.
The design of the proposal was to quickly allocate the money to curb
the downward spiral, and it has in large part been spent. Finding the
Bailout unconstitutional is probably moot in terms of reacquiring the
funds in the short term. But, finding the act itself unconstitutional
would redraw the line between congressionally permissible
delegations and over-delegations.
A future finding that the Bailout is unconstitutional will likely
not change anything today. This generation failed to heed the
warning of the Great Depression. But a future finding of the Bailout
as unconstitutional may provide future generations with a more stark

130. Robert A. Levy, Is the Bailout Constitutional?, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 20, 2008,
availableat http://www.cato.org/pub-display.php?pubid=9729.
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warning about the limits of the Constitution. Only time will tell if the
Bailout will be a success and help bring America out of the drudgery
of economic instability. But, even if it does prove to be successful,
saving the American economy may have cost more than any
American was willing to pay.

